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losses over historical cost go into net income and measures of regulatory capital only 
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and that the holdings of AFS assets are related to the intensity of this activity. Our 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fair-value accounting (FVA) involves reporting assets and liabilities on the balance sheet at a 
market or model-determined value and recognizing changes in said value as gains or losses in the 
income statement or through equity. Banks, and other financial institutions, are especially subject 
to FVA, since the assets most affected by fair value standards, financial instruments, represent a 
significant share of their balance sheets. The debate on the appropriateness and effects of FVA in 
banks has, therefore, been heated. FVA has been blamed, among other effects, for the increased 
volatility of earnings and of other balance sheet variables such as capital ratios. This increased 
volatility may affect the market’s perception of risk or lead to increased uncertainty in other 
variables that may depend on earnings such as capital ratios or, more indirectly, managers’ 
compensation. Thus, bank managers may have motivations for a misrepresentation of earnings 
(earnings management): managers may smooth earnings –reduce their volatility- and thus signal 
lower risk to the market, achieve stable compensation and/or manage the regulatory capital. The 
existence in the balance-sheet of items that are valued at historical cost leaves room for some 
degree of earnings management and it has been suggested that further application of FVA would 
moderate this discretionary behavior, so the value relevance of the accounting numbers would be 
enhanced and the malincentive induced by the increased volatility would be eliminated. 
 
In this paper we argue that current FVA standards for the valuation of financial securities still 
allow for the managing of earnings: SFAS 115 requires financial securities to be classified into 
Trading assets (TA, intended to be actively traded and reported at fair value), Held-to-maturity 
(HTM, intended to be retained until maturity, and valued at amortized cost) and Available-for-Sale 
(AFS). AFS assets have a peculiar accounting regime: they are reported at fair value, but fair value 
gains/losses in AFS are not included in net income –or in equity computed for capital 
requirements- until the asset is sold. Thus, there is some discretion as to when the gains or losses 
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in AFS assets will appear in earnings and regulatory capital, so AFS assets give some flexibility to 
bank managers: indirect evidence of this is the fact that after implementation of SFAS 115, AFS 
assets became the largest class in banks’ balance-sheets. We attempt to show evidence that AFS 
have indeed been actively used for this transaction-based earnings management by banks. We 
assembled what we believe is the most comprehensive and longest database of post-FVA (1994-
2010) accounting data of US banks used so far in the literature. The database covers both 
commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) and contains data from listed and non-
listed banks. Our baseline analysis focuses on the relationship between earnings and capital in 
banks and the realization of fair value gains in AFS securities (through the sale of said assets). We 
show very robust evidence that realizations of fair value gains in AFS securities have been 
significantly related to income smoothing and to capital management. Income smoothing appears 
to be related to signaling (including some evidence of loss avoidance) but the result is robust to 
subsamples of listed vs. non-listed banks, thus suggesting that the motivations go beyond those 
provided by capital markets and could be consistent with managerial compensation motivations. 
The results also hold when we distinguish between BHCs and commercial banks, between 
different subperiods and when we look only at the years of the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, 
our results suggest that the amount of AFS securities held by the bank and of the cumulative fair 
value gains in said securities is positively related to the income smoothing practices, suggesting 
that banks consciously accumulate AFS securities. Finally, we posit that this discretionary use for 
AFS assets may be the reason why SFAS 159, which gave the flexibility to reclassify AFS assets 
into TA, did not have a major impact on bank behavior and holdings of securities, other than 
generating some extraordinary realization of gains in the quarter of application: banks had large 
proportions of AFS assets before SFAS 159, and holdings of these assets even increased 
significantly after banks were given the “fair value option”, contrary to what was expected. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we comment on some relevant literature on 
FVA in the banking sector and earnings management. We review the differential accounting 
treatment of the categories of banks’ assets and the implications for bank earnings management. 
We then present the hypotheses of our analysis. In Section 3 we describe the data, empirical 
specifications and results. In Section 4 we conclude. 
 
2. FVA AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN THE BANKING SECTOR 
2.1 FVA in banks: relevant standards and the asset categories 
FVA involves reporting assets and liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value and recognizing 
changes in fair value as gains and losses in the income statement or directly through equity. Gvien 
that the assets most affected by FVA are financial securities, and these figure prominently in 
banks’ balance sheets, the debate about the effects and convenience of the use of FVA in banking 
is ongoing.1  
 
Proponents of FVA use have suggested several benefits. First, FVA better reflects the bank’s 
exposure towards risk, especially in volatile times, by capturing elements of risk not captured by 
non-fair value measures of income (see Hodder et al., 2006, and Blankespoor et al., 2010, for 
recent evidence). Thus, market discipline enhances efficiency and leads to a prompt detection of 
insolvent banks. Second, income smoothing and earnings management are possible under 
historical cost (if corporate results worsen, management can influence reported income by selling 
revalued assets) whereas under FVA the possibility of income smoothing is reduced: the asset is 
already at fair value and the gain/loss from its revaluation was reflected in the income statement in 
the moment it was generated. Opponents of FVA claim, first, that fair value increases the volatility 
of bank’s earnings and reduces their predictability. This incremental volatility, however, seems not 
                                                 
1 According to the American Bankers Association (2009), FVA is appropriate for assets that are held for trading 
purposes or if an entity’s business model is based and managed on fair value, but for traditional commercial banks and 
for loans, leases, and securities that are held to maturity, FVA can be inappropriate and misleading. 
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to have been reflected in bank share prices (Barth et al., 1996, Eccher et al., 1996, and Nelson, 
1996). Second, the transparency in valuation and performance measurement may be dubious in 
illiquid markets or when several valuation techniques are used in a single financial report (Allen 
and Carletti, 2008). Third, market discipline may penalize a bank affected by a sudden liquidity 
shock or bank managers who expect such a shock may act conservatively and make inefficient 
portfolio choices (Freixas and Tsomocos, 2004). Fourth, in illiquid markets there arise unintended 
effects such as sham transactions used to increase prices or the exacerbation of illiquidity -banks 
being unwilling to sell securities at prices that force other assets to be marked-down (Heaton et al., 
2010). Finally, the use of FVA may lead to excessive leverage in booms and write-downs in busts, 
thus generating procyclicality (Laux and Leuz, 2009, 2010).2 
 
FVA affects banks mostly through the valuation of financial instruments as developed in SFAS 
115 and 133, issued in 1993 and 2001, respectively. SFAS115 required the use of fair value for a 
significant amount of debt and equity securities, which SFAS 133 extended to derivative 
instruments. SFAS 115 introduced a classification of asset categories that, we believe, had 
important implications.3 “Loans and leases” (around half of a bank’s total assets), and “Time 
deposits and debt” (34% of total liabilities: Nissim and Penman, 2007), are valued at historical 
cost, and thus not subject to FVA.4 The other large part of banks’ assets, “Securities,” can be 
classified as TA or “Other securities.” TA are bought and held for the purpose of selling them in 
the near term. They are reported at fair value and fair value changes are recognized in the income 
                                                 
2 More comprehensive accounts of the pros and cons of FVA and further references can be found in Landsman (2007), 
Penman (2007), Benston (2008) and Laux and Leuz (2009). 
3 SFAS 157, issued in 2006, clarified the definition of fair value and established a framework for measurement and 
disclosure by requiring the distinction between Level 1 assets (fair value is estimated through quoted prices in active 
markets for identical assets: mark-to-market), Level 2 assets (models based on observable inputs are used: mark-to-
model) and Level 3 assets (models based on unobservable inputs are used). Distinguishing among these is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but it could offer further insights: see Song et al. (2010). Fiechter and Meyer (2011) examined 
whether banks used discretion in fair value to manage earnings during the 2008 financial crisis and found evidence 
that banks with low earnings before fair value recognized higher Level 3 of fair value income during 2008. 
4 L&L can be classified as “held-for-investment” or “held-for-sale”. Held-for-sale L&L are carried at the lower of 
historical cost or fair value, but the fraction of L&L in this category is typically small. 
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statement. “Other securities” not held for trading are classified either as HTM or AFS. Debt 
securities are classified as HTM if the bank has the intent and ability to hold them till maturity and 
they are reported at amortized cost.5 AFS securities have a peculiar accounting treatment: they are 
carried at fair value but unrealized fair value gains/losses are not recognized in the income 
statement but rather in a separate component of shareholders’ equity called “accumulated other 
comprehensive income” which is not included in the calculation of measures of regulatory capital 
(Tier 1, especially).6 Only when the asset is sold the realized gain or loss is brought to net income 
and is computed in regulatory capital.7 If a bank has the intent and ability to retain some AFS asset 
for a period sufficient to allow for a recovery of market prices, it can treat losses on the asset as 
temporary and avoid the effect on income and regulatory capital. Thus, the manager has discretion 
to decide when to sell the asset and when the gain/loss in the asset’s fair value will appear in net 
income or regulatory capital (although the accumulated gains are already included in shareholders’ 
equity). This strategy is not costless, since the assets must be sold to realize the gain, but it is also 
not subject to ex-post scrutiny, as some accrual-based operations may be. 
 
Most of the literature has focused on the asset categories and on the use of AFS gains in rather 
descriptive ways or in limited contexts such as the application of SFAS 159 (Song, 2008; Dong et 
al., 2011). Nissim and Penman (2007) and Laux and Leuz (2010) show BHC data on the 
proportion of banks’ securities in each category.8 TA are only a significant fraction (a maximum of 
12% of assets) of the balance sheets of the largest BHCs, but are unimportant –basically zero- for 
the majority of BHCs and commercial banks.9 Given this proportion of assets that are strictly 
                                                 
5 HTM securities are subject to other-than-temporary impairment testing. Also, banks have to disclose the aggregate 
fair value of HTM securities in the notes to the financial statements. 
6 45% of these unrealized gains may be included in calculations of Tier II capital, but subject to an adjustment in risk-
weighted assets. 
7 If the change in valuation is deemed “other-than-temporary,” the asset has to be written-down to its fair value and the 
loss is recognized in the income statement. 
8 We show some more comprehensive and recent data in Section 3. 
9 Almost all derivatives are classified as trading (96% of notional value, 97% of fair value) and are reported on the 
balance sheet at fair value (2% of total assets, 2% of total liabilities). 
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reported at fair value (TA), one might conclude that for BHCs the impact of fair value on income 
and regulatory capital has been more limited than often claimed and for commercial banks it has 
been probably negligible (Laux and Leuz, 2009). Of the “Other securities”, 95% (16% of total 
assets) are classified as AFS, whereas the remaining 5% (1% of assets) are HTM. This is a bit 
surprising, given that AFS was a residual category for debt securities and most equity securities 
are classified as trading assets. In other words, banks seem to have had an incentive to classify 
securities as AFS. Further evidence comes from application of SFAS 159, which gave banks the 
possibility to reclassify AFS and HTM securities into TA (under the “fair value option”, FVO) in 
order to reduce asset-liability accounting mismatches. Song (2008), Hsu (2009) and Chiang et al. 
(2011) provide evidence that banks used the FVO for earnings management, especially to remove 
AFS securities with loss positions and to report higher earnings but, as Laux and Leuz (2009) 
show, the fraction of non-trading securities that banks reported under the FVO was not large. In 
fact, banks chose to accumulate AFS assets again during 2008 (see also Figure 1 below). 
 
2.2 Earnings management in banks 
The literature on earnings management by banks is quite extensive.10 Several motivations have 
been suggested for bank managers to affect or misrepresent earnings data. First, explicit 
management of earnings figures may be a way for banks to signal the good quality of their 
business and balance-sheets (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997, Ahmed et al., 1999). Second, 
accounting rules allow for discretion in certain items, such as loss provisions, which affect the 
book value of capital. Hence, earnings management could result from accounting practices 
intended to meet minimum capital requirements set by the monetary authority (Beatty et al., 1995, 
Wall and Koch, 2000). Third, an inter-temporal averaging of reported economic earnings could 
                                                 
10 Goel and Thakor (2003) distinguish between real and artificial earnings management. The latter is achieved through 
the reporting flexibility provided by some accounting principles and it is negative for firm value since it undermines 
the credibility of financial statements and misleads investors and other stakeholders. Here, we are concerned with this 
type of earnings management, allowed by –or a consequence of- accounting standards. 
 7
make net income look less volatile. In the banking industry, managers would have incentives for 
this explicit income smoothing in order to signal low exposure to risk or to attain stable 
compensation objectives (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow et al, 2010, for recent evidence).11 
 
The usual instrument associated with earnings management is the use of some discretionary 
accrual (accrual-based earnings management). In the banking sector, analyses have focused on the 
manipulation of reserves and, more specifically, of the loan loss provision (LLP): bank managers 
can use the LLP to reduce the volatility of the reported earnings –earnings smoothing- or to affect 
regulatory capital measures, among other objectives. The basic strategy to smooth earnings is to 
understate (overstate) the provisions when earnings are low (high) in order to mitigate the adverse 
(positive) effects of other factors on earnings. The use of LLP dynamics to smooth net income has 
been tested in a number of empirical studies (Nelson et al., 2003) but the results have varied with 
the samples and methodologies used. Wetmore and Brick (1994) and Ahmed et al. (1999) did not 
find significant evidence of the use of LLP for income smoothing. On the other hand, Ma (1988), 
Beatty et al. (1995), Collins et al. (1995) and Pérez et al. (2008) showed evidence consistent with 
smoothing practices. In the case of earnings management aimed at affecting regulatory capital, the 
evidence has been slightly more consistent: Beatty et al. (1995), Ahmed et al. (1999) and Pérez et 
al. (2008) all found support for the use of LLP for capital management. 
  
Banks can, alternatively, do earnings management through transactions or real activities. Indeed, 
Graham et al. (2005) find that most earnings management results from manipulating real operating 
activities such as R&D expenditures and asset sales. These other tools for earnings management 
may, in fact, be less subject to scrutiny and, therefore, may be more desirable despite the higher 
                                                 
11 A reduction of taxes paid has also been suggested as a motivation for earnings management, but empirical evidence 
in this regard has been scarce (Scholes et al., 1990; Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 1995). 
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cost involved.12 The PCAOB states that “Some earnings management activities involve legitimate 
discretionary choices of when to enter into transactions that require accounting recognition, not 
unlike legitimate year-end tax planning decisions made to accelerate deductions or defer taxable 
income’’( PCAOB, 2000, paragraph 3.18). In the case of banks, strategic timing of asset sales and, 
more specifically, of financial securities become the obvious choice for transaction based earnings 
management: loan transfers (Karaoglu, 2005), contingent convertible bonds (Marquardt and 
Wiedman, 2005), credit swaps (Song and Linsmeier, 2010) and securitized assets (Dechow and 
Shakespeare, 2009, Dechow et al., 2010) have all been found to be used for earnings management 
practices.13 Moyer (1990) showed early evidence that gains and losses in securities were related to 
capital adequacy. Scholes et al. (1990) also showed evidence that tax considerations and low 
capital ratios led to sales of appreciated assets. Beatty et al. (1995) carried out a more 
comprehensive analysis on five earnings management tools (both accrual-based and transaction-
based) and found that a composite measure of gains in sales of assets –that included securities but 
also physical assets and other miscellanous terms- was related to capital targets and to a smoothing 
of earnings. In a similar analysis, Collins et al. (1995) found no consistent relation between capital 
ratios and realized security gains, but found some support to earnings smoothing through security 
sales. More recently, Lifschutz (2002), in an analysis related to ours but of much more limited 
scope, looked at the earnings smoothing effects of SFAS 115, and showed a negative relation 
between “gains trading” (selling appreciated securities to recognize gains while securities with 
unrealized losses are held to avoid recognizing those losses) and earnings levels before tax and 
securities net gains.  
 
                                                 
12 In a recent review of earnings quality research Defond (2010) stresses that, in view of the frequency of the use of 
transactions-based earnings management, the research on such activities is surprisingly scarce compared to that on 
accruals-based earnings management. 
13 See Nelson et al., 2003, for a general review of cases where auditors believe their clients selectively timed 
recognition of realized gains or losses on investments. 
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As we mentioned before, one of the suggested advantages of FVA is that it reduces the possibility 
for earnings management. None of the analyses we have cited, however, explicitly incorporated 
considerations of the effect of FVA standards. The special accounting treatment of realized fair 
value gains/losses in AFS securities makes such securities the most likely candidates for strategic 
timing of asset sales. Indeed, Hunton et al. (2006) and Van Beest (2009) provide experimental 
evidence that managers believe AFS assets to be a tool that can be used for reporting flexibility. 
To our knowledge, however, consistent empirical evidence on generalized use of this strategy by 
banks –or by other sectors- has not been uncovered so far. 
 
2.3 FVA and earnings management in banks: hypotheses 
Our discussion suggests that AFS securities are potentially valuable earnings management tools. 
This possibility has been recognized (Hunton et al., 2006, Van Beest, 2009) but little evidence has 
been uncovered of whether (and how) AFS gains/losses have effectively been used for this 
practice. We derive now several testable hypotheses that constitute the roadmap of our analysis. 
 
First, if bank managers use fair value gains in AFS as a tool for earnings management, we should 
observe that these gains are realized when net income is low (earnings smoothing) or when capital 
ratios are low or close to the minimum (management of capital requirements). Given our previous 
discussion of the reasons behind this activity, this use of gains in AFS assets is not necessarily 
limited to banks subject to capital market discipline (listed banks) or to large Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) with trading portfolios. Second, both the level of AFS assets in the balance 
sheet (AFS assets intended to be “used” by the bank) and the total amount of cumulative gains in 
AFS assets (“opportunity” to use the fair value gains) should be related to the intensity of the 
management of earnings. Third, signaling arguments suggest that gains in AFS assets could be 
used, in particular, to avoid having to announce negative earnings. “Loss avoiding” banks might 
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then realize enough fair value gains to yield positive before-tax earnings. Fourth, previous research 
has shown that earnings management transactions occur with greater frequency in the last few 
days of the quarter (see, e.g., Dechow and Shakespeare, 2009). Similar arguments lead us to expect 
to observe a different behavior in the 4th quarter of the year since, for example, compensation 
packages are examined in the 4th quarter. Fifth, the introduction of the FVO in 2007Q4 should not 
have led to major reclassifications of AFS assets into Trading assets, and the use –and holdings- of 
AFS assets should have continued even after the FVO. Finally, we expect accrual-based earnings 
management in banks (via the loan loss provision) to have been subject to increased scrutiny 
during the financial crisis, so we would expect banks to resort more intensely to the earnings 
management tools that are less “contestable” by the authorities: these are probably transaction-
based tools, among which the sale of AFS securities may have been readily available for banks 
that had large amounts of such assets. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on the most comprehensive and longest database of bank 
information available (see Lifschutz, 2002, Poitras et al., 2002, Song, 2008, Dong et al., 2011, for 
more limited samples and scopes). The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Regulatory 
Database contains quarterly accounting data from the required regulatory forms filed for 
supervising purposes by regulated depository financial institutions (BHCs, commercial banks, 
savings banks, and S&L institutions). We collected balance sheet, income statement and regulatory 
capital data for all commercial banks and BHCs in the database –these banks are all required to 
prepare their Financial Statements in accordance with US GAAP-. The Appendix provides a list of 
the specific variables we use, which we describe below, and the database codes. The final sample 
ranges from 1994Q1 to 2010Q4. The initial period is determined by application of SFAS 115, 
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which first required the classification of securities into TA, AFS and HTM. Capital ratios are 
available from 1996Q1, so analyses with regulatory capital data are done on a slightly smaller 
sample period. We include controls for macroeconomic conditions, which we collected from the 
Federal Reserve. 
 
3.2 Baseline specification 
Our first baseline hypothesis postulates that bank managers use the amount of realized fair value 
gains in AFS discretionarily to affect the reported value of earnings or regulatory capital measures. 
An income smoothing strategy would imply realizing gains (losses) by selling AFS assets when 
earnings are low (high): if bank managers follow this behavior systematically we should observe a 
negative relationship between realized AFS gains and net income before realized AFS gains or 
losses (and before taxes) (income smoothing). Regarding capital management, we would expect a 
negative relationship between realized AFS gains and the value of the regulatory ratio (capital 
management). As our baseline model we estimate the following: 
RAFSit = β0 + β1RAFSit-1 + β2NIBRit + β3T1it-1 + controls + εit              (1) 
where εit is an error term, and: 
- RAFSit measures the amount of gains or losses in AFS assets realized by bank i in period t, 
relative to total assets of the bank. Note that (1) includes the lagged value as a regressor in order to 
control for persistence. 
- NIBRit denotes net income before taxes in period t (and before RAFSit) relative to total assets: this 
term allows us to capture income smoothing practices: we expect a negative sign of β2. 
- T1it-1 is the level of bank i’s Tier 1 capital ratio (Tier 1 capital over risk weighted assets) at the 
beginning of the period (end of period t-1). This variable aims to detect earnings management 
related to regulatory capital requirements: we expect β3 to be negative. 
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We control for observable bank characteristics –the composition of the balance-sheet- and for 
macroeconomic factors. We include the following controls in all regressions: 
- Sizeit is the logarithm of total assets of the bank. Larger banks tend to be listed BHCs with more 
active trading activities for which we expect more frequent sales of financial assets. 
- Depit is the amount of deposits as a fraction of total assets. The deposit component of leverage is 
less expensive than other financing and may therefore affect earnings and the amount of RAFS 
necessary for earnings management.  
- Liquidit: liquid assets as a fraction of total assets. This variable controls for the possibility of sales 
of AFS assets aimed at obtaining a certain level of liquidity. 
- Secit: securities as a fraction of total assets. This variable proxies for the intensity of the bank’s 
trading –non-traditional– activities. We expect it to be positively related to sales of AFS assets.  
- Loansit: net loans and leases as a fraction of total assets. This ratio is considered a measure of the 
specialization of the bank in –and of exposure of earnings to- traditional activities. This variable 
works in the opposite direction to Secit.  
- Fixedit: fixed assets as a fraction of total assets. Higher levels of fixed –illiquid- assets could 
influence AFS selling strategies. 
- Nondepit: Liabilities (total assets minus book value of equity) minus deposits, as a fraction of 
total assets. This variable measures the non-deposit component of leverage which is a more 
unstable and costly source of financing and is, therefore, related to the volatility of earnings. 
- Unempt: the macroeconomic variable that we use to proxy for the economic cycle is the change 
in unemployment rates (so a positive value means a worsening economy). The use of other 
indicators led to similar results. 
 
On top of this baseline specification (which allows for a direct test of the first hypothesis in 
Section 2.3) we later add terms that parallel the hypotheses in Section 2.3 and/or qualify the results 
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by doing the analysis on subsamples of the data. We explain those alternative specifications as we 
comment on the results. 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Some descriptive statistics of bank’s balance sheets 
The data in Table 1 show the proportions of each type of securities in the balance-sheets of the 
banks in our complete sample (all BHCs and commercial banks that file with the Federal Reserve) 
and also for the subsamples of listed and non-listed banks. The distributions of asset proportions 
across subsamples are similar and quite skewed for HTM and TA: note the difference between 
medians and means. The main fact is that AFS assets represent the largest proportion of securities 
in all types of banks. HTM assets appear in relatively small amounts and significant proportions of 
TA are only a large (listed) BHC phenomenon.14 These statistics are based on all firm-quarter 
observations. Figure 1 shows the evolution over time of the median proportion of assets in the AFS 
and HTM class (median proportion of TA is zero in all periods) for all banks, listed banks and 
BHCs.15 Note that two years after introduction of the security classification, the median bank had 
basically relinquished HTM securities and held only AFS assets. This asset class “rebalancing” 
was done through a very sharp reclassification in one single quarter: a Special Q&A Report on 
SFAS 115 (FASB, 1995, issued on November 15) allowed for a month-and-a-half “window of 
opportunity” before the end of 1995 through which HTM assets could be reclassified as AFS. 
Most banks took advantage of this option and reclassified large proportions of their HTM assets in 
1995Q4.16 The behavior in 2007Q4 is also remarkable: the FVO given by SFAS 159 did not 
                                                 
14 The fact that holdings of TA and –in results not shown- the sales of such assets are quite low compared to AFS 
assets is evidence in favor of our arguments: the main difference between the two types of assets is the special 
accounting treatment of the fair value gains. 
15 Note that the ups and downs in Figure 1 reflect changes in both price and quantity of the assets although the 
denominator of the ratio (total assets) is also subject to price fluctuations, which in part alleviates the problem. We 
have no simple way of isolating the evolution of quantities, so the graph must be interpreted with caution.  
16 The notes to the 1995 annual financial statements had to mention this reclassification. For example, Citicorp 
explicitly describes that “On November 30, 1995, Citicorp transferred $4,749 million of debt securities from the held-
to-maturity category to the available-for-sale category at fair value ($4,334 million), as permitted under guidelines 
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generate a major reclassification of AFS securities into TA. Instead, holdings of AFS securities 
increased after issuance of SFAS 159, following some quarters of downward trend: in the years 
immediately before SFAS 159 gains/losses in AFS assets were realized, but after 2008 banks 
accumulated AFS assets again. 
 
3.3.2 Baseline Analysis: Income smoothing and capital requirements 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions. Note that realized 
gains/losses in AFS assets are a small part of net income (a maximum of 10% in the largest banks, 
much less for smaller banks): this will affect the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, so in the 
tables we show coefficient estimates –other than the persistence- which have been multiplied by 
one hundred (this is equivalent to expressing RAFS in percentage terms). All equations have been 
estimated by OLS with 2-way cluster errors (using bank and time period as clusters; see Petersen, 
2009, and Gow et al., 2011). Results coming from other methodologies –including panel data 
methods-, which lead to similar conclusions, are available upon request. 
 
Table 3a shows the full sample results of baseline equation (1).17 The persistence parameter of 
RAFS is significant but small, a result which was to be expected. There is strong evidence for 
income smoothing: the parameter on NIBRit has the expected negative sign and it is significant 
even at the 1% level. Thus, RAFS are larger when net income before taxes and RAFS is low. The 
direct effect of the capital ratio (T1it-1) is also significant at conventional levels, so earnings 
management seems to be related both to income smoothing and to capital ratios.18 The effect of the 
                                                                                                                                                                
issued by the FASB. As a result, stockholders' equity was reduced $260 million (net of tax).” This reclassification left 
Citicorp with zero holdings of HTM securities at the end of December 1995 (Citicorp, 1996). 
17 Note that in some of our analyses we show the results of specifications with and without the T1 variable. This is due 
to the fact that T1 is available from 1996 on, so analyses that utilize this variable have two fewer years of data. 
18 A nonlinear effect of capital requirements may be observed if earnings management only occurs when the ratio is at 
or below the minimum required value. We have estimated models with a dummy which takes value one if T1it-1 is 
equal to or lower than 4% (the required value of Tier 1 capital) at the end of period t-1 and zero otherwise. We also 
interacted this “threshold” dummy with NIBRit to allow for income smoothing triggered by a low capital ratio. No 
significant nonlinear effects were found. 
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control variables, when significant, is generally aligned with prior intuition, so we will only 
comment on the controls when some result of special interest arises. 
 
Table 3b shows the results of splitting the sample into listed and non-listed banks. Interestingly, 
income smoothing and capital management are significant for non-listed banks. This suggests 
motivations for earnings management beyond those related to signalling to investors or to 
incentives provided by the capital markets. On the other hand, the fact that we do not find 
significant income smoothing for listed banks is a bit more surprising. We show later that this 
result is due to listed banks with negative earnings (which are a small part of the sample), and that 
when we distinguish between listed banks with positive and negative earnings a more reasonable 
picture appears. The results we show in Tables 3a-b do not stem from the behavior of a few 
extreme banks: Table 3c shows the average value of RAFS for portfolios of banks constructed 
using the deciles of the distribution of NIBR. As it can be seen, there is a clear decreasing pattern 
of mean RAFS over the decile portfolios for the overall sample and for both listed and non-listed 
banks (with the exception of the first two deciles: see below). Also, the proportion of negative 
instances of RAFS is quite similar across deciles, suggesting that the negative relationship between 
NIBR and RAFS is not coming from a few negative realizations of RAFS by banks with large 
profits. 
 
The onset of the financial crisis makes 2007Q3 a quarter where we could observe significant 
changes in bank behavior. 19 Indeed, in Section 2.3 we hypothesized that the use of RAFS during 
the crisis would probably be more intense, whereas we would expect accrual-based tools to be less 
used. Tables 3d and 3e show the results of splitting the sample into two subperiods, using 2007Q3 
as the breakpoint. Table 3d includes a dummy variable Dit which identifies the crisis quarters. This 
                                                 
19 We have run all our regressions using as an alternative breakpoint the introduction of SFAS 159. This break, 
however, leads to subsamples that only differ in one quarter from the “financial crisis break”, so the results are 
basically equivalent: they are available upon request, but they do not offer any additional insight. 
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variable is interacted with the main regressors of interest (persistence, NIBR and T1) in order to 
facilitate significance testing of the differences in parameters during the crisis. Indeed we observe 
quite significant differences in behavior: first, RAFS are significantly less persistent during the 
crisis; second, more intense income smoothing is carried out –by nonlisted banks- during the 
crisis. This result is in line with the last of the hypotheses developed in Section 2.3 (we carry out 
some further analyses on this hypothesis in Section 3.3.5). Given the differences uncovered across 
periods, Table 3e shows the results of splitting the samples into pre-crisis (1996Q1 to 2007Q2) and 
post-crisis (2007Q3 to 2010Q4), a strategy we use in the rest of the paper. Apart from the two 
main results mentioned, some of the control variables also seem to have a different impact on 
RAFS in the two subperiods. Of special interest is the cyclical variable Unempit: in the pre-crisis 
RAFS behave countercyclically, so banks realize more gains in AFS assets in bad economic 
periods. 
 
The results in Table 3b suggested that listed banks have not carried out income smoothing via 
RAFS. However, the behavior of mean RAFS in Table 3c for listed banks is quite similar to that of 
non-listed banks. In particular, mean RAFS in the first decile (banks with lowest NIBR) are much 
smaller than in the second decile. From this second decile on, the decreasing pattern implied by 
income smoothing arises in both subsamples of banks and in the global sample. In other words, the 
behaviour of banks with low values of NIBR (pre-tax losses) seems to differ from the rest of the 
banks in the sample in a kind of nonlinearity or “kink” in the smoothing behaviour. We examine 
this issue in Tables 3f and 3g, where we report the results obtained for samples split on the basis of 
the sign of NIBR. Table 3f contains the results for the full sample. Banks with positive NIBR carry 
out income smoothing and capital management in both subperiods (income smoothing is again 
more intense during the crisis). However, banks with negative NIBR (approximately 6% of the 
total observations before the crisis and 23% during the crisis) seem not to do either one, and their 
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behaviour reflects probably more of a “bad news” story: bad times (low NIBR) go hand in hand 
with low gains in AFS securities and low realized gains.20 When we split the sample into listed and 
nonlisted banks the results nicely align: both groups do significant income smoothing when NIBR 
is positive (and listed banks do so more intensely) and both are subject to the “bad news” story 
when NIBR is negative (listed banks also showing a higher “bad news” coefficient). This 
“nonlinearity” for negative NIBR is in line with the results shown in Table 3c, and it explains the 
apparent lack of income smoothing found for listed banks in Table 3b. Capital management is 
done by listed banks with losses in the pre-crisis period and by non-listed banks in both periods.21  
 
Given the differences in terms of regulation, size and activities between Bank Holding Companies 
(BHC) and commercial banks (Com) –the data are stored in different sub-databases within the 
Bank Regulatory Database- it seems convenient to check that there are no significant differences 
between the two types of banks.22 In Table 3h we show the results of the baseline specification for 
BHC and Com. The results are quite comparable: in particular, income smoothing appears both for 
BHCs and commercial banks (although this effect is less strong for commercial banks during pre-
crisis period) and there is evidence of capital management for both types of banks before the crisis 
and for commercial banks during the financial crisis. We have replicated all subsequent analyses 
for the BHC/Com subsamples, but no further insights were obtained, so we do not show further 
results for these subsamples. 
 
                                                 
20 A similar nonlinearity has been uncoverd for nonfinancial firms in the context of managerial compensation: in a 
context of losses, by anticipating future accruals current losses increase –which implies no managerial cost at present- 
but the chances of future bonuses improve (Degeorge et al., 1999). This “big bath” strategy predicts a non-linear 
relationship in which the smoothing instrument is used in the opposite direction for particularly low earnings (see, e.g., 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002, for how big-bath and smoothing strategies can coexist). We believe that the result 
we obtain here does not come from the use of big-bath strategies by banks, which are quite difficult to rationalize. 
Indeed, the percentage of negative realizations of RAFS is the smallest for the group of banks with losses –see Table 
3c-, thus suggesting that the effect we uncover is indeed a “bad news” story.  
21 The only subsample of non-listed banks that does not carry out significant capital management is the group that has 
higher capital ratios: note the median values of T1it-1 shown in the last row of each panel. 
22 There is no strict parallel between the two classifications (listed/non-listed and BHCs/commercial), although it is the 
case that most listed banks are BHCs and most commercial banks are non-listed. 
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Our second hypothesis related the intensity of income smoothing to holdings of AFS assets (“use” 
of AFS assets) and to the total amount of unrealized gains/losses in said assets in the balance sheet 
(“opportunity”). Tables 4a and 4b show the results of augmenting the baseline equation with two 
terms that control for the proportion of AFS holdings at the beginning of the quarter, AFSit-1, and 
its interaction with NIBR (Table 4a) and for the accumulated unrealized gains at the beginning of 
the quarter, UNRAFSit-1, and its interaction with NIBR (Table 4b).23 If AFS are held for smoothing 
purposes, the coefficient on the interaction term in Table 4a should be negative and significant, 
denoting increased smoothing beyond a “level” effect (from having large proportions of AFS 
assets). The results show that this is the case both for the complete sample and for the subsample 
of non-listed banks (during the crisis: before the crisis the coefficient is not significant for non-
listed banks). Incidentally, the control variable Secit stops being significant, suggesting that the 
level of AFS is enough to account for the higher use of RAFS. Listed banks also show a negative 
estimate of the effect of the interaction term, but the coefficient is never significant. One of the 
reasons for this lack of significance may be that the cross-sectional variation of both AFS holdings 
and NIBR in the listed banks sample is significantly smaller than for the non-listed sample (results 
not shown, but available upon request) thus leading to a coefficient estimate with a larger standard 
error. Table 4b shows the results of controlling, instead, for the level of unrealized gains/losses in 
AFS assets. The income smoothing effect now is significant, and it appears for the whole sample 
and non-listed banks (both periods) and for listed banks (pre-crisis). Summing up, both the amount 
of AFS assets but, more importantly, the accumulated unrealized gains in those assets are 
important determinants of income smoothing practices. 
 
Avoiding a loss, if enough revalued AFS assets are available, can be an important motivation for 
income smoothing related to signalling. We show some indirect evidence for this motivation by 
                                                 
23 For the sake of interpretation of the coefficients, in the analyses in Tables 4a and 4b the values of AFSit-1 and 
UNRAFSit-1 have been divided by the maximum value in the sample, so the highest value they can take is one. 
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carryng out an analysis on a special subsample of banks. Table 5a shows the results of the baseline 
equation estimated using data only from banks that had negative NIBR, but positive RAFS enough 
to yield positive net income before taxes and “post RAFS”. The negative coefficient on the 
smoothing term is always slightly above one hundred in absolute value: the magnitude of realized 
gains in AFS was just sufficient to bring net income to slightly positive. Standard errors of these 
parameter estimates are quite low, so the coefficients are very robustly estimated. This, admittedly 
ad hoc, analysis suggests that when banks use AFS gains to turn negative net income into positive 
the amount of gains realized is intended to cover the loss (maybe accounting for taxes to be paid) 
but the quantity of AFS assets sold is limited so that the rest of the stock of “unrealized gains in 
AFS” is kept for the future. In order to ensure that this special subsample is not driving the overall 
results in Tables 3a-3f, we run the baseline regressions omitting this subsample of “loss avoiding” 
banks. Table 5b shows that indeed the income smoothing behaviour found in the baseline analyses 
is generally present and it is not just a consequence of loss avoidance by a small set of banks. 
 
3.3.3 The 4th quarter effect 
Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) show that earnings management transactions occur with greater 
frequency in the last few days of the quarter. We do not have daily data, so we cannot observe a 
fine timing of AFS transactions. However, similar arguments lead us to expect to observe a 
different behavior in the 4th quarter of the year since, for example, compensation packages are 
examined in the 4th quarter. In order to obtain evidence of differences in behavior in the last 
quarters of the year, we follow two routes. Table 6a shows the results of including in the baseline 
equation a control for end-of-year effects. We estimate the following regression: 
RAFSit = β0 + β1RAFSit-1 + β2NIBRit + β3T1it-1 + β4D4it + β5D4it·YNIBRit +  controls + εit      (2) 
where D4it is a dummy that takes value one if period t is the fourth quarter of the year and zero 
otherwise. YNIBRit is the cumulative end-of-year income before taxes and fourth quarter RAFS. If 
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banks smooth yearly earnings we should find a significant negative sign of the coefficient of the 
interaction D4it·YNIBRit. No significant results appear for the whole sample (and, hence, for non-
listed banks). Listed banks, on the other hand, seem to have used fourth quarter RAFS to increase 
annual earnings during the pre-crisis period, but used the last quarter RAFS to smooth earnings 
during the crisis. We carry out one more analysis in this regard. Table 6b shows the results of 
focusing on large realizations of RAFS. The dependent variable in the table, bigRAFSit, takes value 
one if RAFS is one standard deviation away from the bank-specific average. In other words, we 
examine values of RAFS that are “large” in size by the standards of each bank. Results of the logit 
estimation show that the probability of observing large RAFS is higher if NIBR is smaller 
(smoothing) and in the fourth quarter of the year. In other words, large sales of AFS assets are 
undertaken more frequently at the end of the year, although there is no evidence that smoothing of 
yearly earnings is behind this practice. 
 
3.3.4 SFAS 159 and the FVO 
In most of our previous analyses we have distinguished the pre and post-crisis behavior. An 
alternative subsampling using the quarter of introduction of SFAS 159 was also carried out. Recent 
studies have suggested that firms used the transitional adjustment provision allowed by SFAS 159 
to manipulate earnings. Song (2008) and Hsu (2009) found that banks used the FVO in its quarter 
of application (2007Q4) to remove available-for-sale securities with loss positions without 
reporting the losses in earnings. The data we showed in Figure 1 are consistent with this finding, 
but they also suggest that holdings of AFS assets increased after introduction of the FVO. We 
investigate possible effects of the specific quarter of application of SFAS 159 by including the 
possibility that smoothing behaviour (or average values of RAFS) may have been different in the 
two quarters around the FVO (2007Q4 and 2008Q1). For that purpose we include in the baseline 
analysis two dummies (07Q4it and 08Q1it) that identify those two quarters, and their interactions 
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with NIBR. The results –shown in Table 7- suggest that banks sold AFS securities with loss 
positions in 2007Q4 (negative significant estimate of 07Q4it), but not for income smoothing 
purposes. On the other hand, listed banks seemed to use 2008Q1 for some extraordinary income 
smoothing (negative significant estimate of the interaction of 08Q1it with NIBRit).24 
 
3.3.5 RAFS and the Loan Loss Provision 
The Loan Loss Provision (LLP) has been analyzed in the banking literature as probably the most 
important accrual-based tool for earnings management. We provide now a final analysis of 
whether LLP-based smoothing behaviour is present in our sample of banks (Table 8) in the pre-
and post-crisis (see our last hypotheses in Section 2.3) and of how the smoothing behavior through 
the realization of gains/losses on AFS securities interacts with the LLP (Table 9).  
 
Table 8 shows estimates of a regression similar to our baseline model, but with the loan loss 
provision LLPit25 as the dependent variable and net income before taxes, LLP and RAFS 
(NIBRLLP) as the income smoothing term. In other words, we are assuming that the LLP is 
decided “before RAFS” (more on this below). The results in Table 8 suggest that in our sample 
income smoothing through the use LLP has occurred during the pre-crisis period for non-listed 
banks but not (significantly) for listed banks. On the other hand, during the crisis we find a “bad 
news” story for both sets of banks: the LLP is positively related to NIBRLLP. Evidence for capital 
management through the LLP is more robust across periods, although the coefficient for listed 
banks in the pre-crisis is again not significant. The LLPit is, as expected, cyclical and related to the 
levels of loans in the balance sheet. 
 
                                                 
24 Chang et al. (2011) show that some banks adopted the FVO as early as 2007Q1, so the results we show may be 
influenced by these “early adopters”. We included an additional 2007Q1 dummy to account for early adopters but 
found no additional smoothing during that quarter, although there was again evidence of higher RAFS. 
25 In order to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients in the regression analysis, the sign of LLP is negative when 
it is an expense and positive when it represents a reversion. 
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In Table 9 we repeat the baseline equations for RAFS but splitting NIBR into NIBRLLP and the 
LLP, and include in the baseline equations for LLP the value of RAFS as an explanatory variable. 
These regressions are intended to see if both instruments are used together to achieve a target 
value of earnings, in which case we’d expect the coefficients of NIBRLLP and LLP to be the same 
in the equation for RAFS, and the coefficients of NIBRLLP and RAFS to be the same in the 
equation for LLP. The table includes in the last line the results of significance tests for equality of 
the two coefficients of interest in each of the specifications. Only in the case of LLP during the 
crisis the two coefficients differ. This suggests that before the crisis both instruments were used 
together to achieve a target value of earnings. However, during the crisis the LLP behaved 
differently (we saw in Table 8 that it was not used for smoothing). RAFS then became the 
instrument for income smoothing. We suggest two tentative explanations for this effect: first, 
intuitively, RAFS may have been used also for “smoothing” the LLP, whose value was probably 
more determined by the effects of the financial crisis (the “bad news” story mentioned above). 
Second, regulators may have placed increased attention on accruals in general and on the LLP in 
particular (during the financial crisis this term became especially “relevant”). Thus, a shift from 
accrual-based earnings management (LLP) to transaction-based earnings management (an 
increased use of RAFS, which we showed in Tables 3d and 3e) may have been a rational bank 
response to increased scrutiny by the regulators. 
 
3.4 Robustness analyses 
We have performed a battery of robustness analyses, some of which we have commented on. We 
outline now the full extent of these analyses and make the results available upon request. In none 
of these the conclusions were significantly affected. Indeed, the earnings management behavior we 
have uncovered is very robust to subsamples, subperiods and methodologies. 
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1) The main income smoothing regressions have been estimated for listed BHCs and Commercial 
banks (not shown) and for BHCs and commercial banks (only one of these is shown in Table 3h). 
2) All specifications have been done including the interaction between AFSit and NIBRit. Also, we 
have performed a set of regressions where we split the sample banks into quartiles defined by the 
level of AFS assets and we estimate separate regressions for the banks in the first and fourth 
quartiles. More intense smoothing is observed for the 4th quartile group, consistent with the 
evidence in Table 4. 
3) The “4th quarter analysis” has also been done with a dummy that accounted for third quarters. 
We included these dummies in nonlinear models, but still we did not obtain significant results. 
4) Different estimation methodologies (panel data with firm and time effects) have been used. 
5) Several cyclical indicators have been used in the regressions (real GDP, stock market indexes) 
but the choice of the cyclical variable had no effect on the final results. 
6) The subperiod analysis has been carried out using SFAS 159 (2007Q4) as the breakpoint. The 
results are identical to those that use 2007Q3. 
7) The SFAS 159 analysis included also a dummy Q107 and its interaction with NIBR (to account 
for early adopters: see Chang et al, 2011). No significant differences in behavior were found for 
these early adopters other than a positive and significant coefficient for Q107. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We have taken a step towards understanding the effects of FVA standards for AFS securities in 
banking behavior and, more specifically, in the extent of transactions-based earnings management 
by banks. AFS securities are reported at fair value, but the fair value gains or losses in these 
securities are only included in net income and in regulatory capital when the assets are sold in the 
market, which allows for some degree of management of regulatory capital and for intertemporal 
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smoothing of earnings. In the case of banks, this smoothing may be intended to signal stable 
income or to affect executive compensation. 
 
We performed a thorough analysis of earnings for listed and non-listed banks, and for BHCs and 
commercial banks, where emphasis was placed on the behavior of the discretionary part of income 
–realized fair value gains or losses from AFS assets- and on its relationship to net income and 
regulatory capital ratios. The conclusions of our analysis are robust to subsamples (BHCs vs. 
commercial; listed vs. non-listed), subperiods, data frequency and empirical specifications. We 
have shown behavior consistent with income smoothing through the timing of the sales of AFS 
securities (realization of fair value gains in said securities) for banks with positive earnings. To 
some extent, this smoothing is related to signaling, since we showed that a subset of banks 
behaved consistent with loss avoidance. We also found evidence of earnings management related 
to regulatory capital requirements. Taken as a whole, our results hint at the value of AFS assets for 
bank managers, who use realized gains in AFS assets for different purposes. It is, then, 
understandable why these assets became the main category in bank’s balance sheets even after 
SFAS 159 gave the possibility to turn them into TA. Indeed, we also showed evidence which 
suggested that the most traditional accrual-based tool for earnings management, the LLP, was less 
used during the financial crisis and AFS assets became a readily available alternative. 
 
We point out limitations of our analysis. First, data on executive compensation would help fine-
tune the reasons behind the smoothing, since our results suggest that compensation may indeed be 
a motivation (but not the only one). Empirical analysis of this issue would have to be limited, 
though, to the sample of listed BHCs. Second, we have not looked at the category of TA, since 
only large BHCs with active trading portfolios have significant amounts of such assets. The 
analysis of banks with significant TA holdings could complement our results but, given that these 
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are strictly the “fair value” assets, the category does not provide flexibility for earnings 
management. Third, we have not placed emphasis on macroeconomic variables, other than 
including some rough cyclical indicators in our regressions. A finer control for macro conditions 
could qualify our conclusions but we believe that the evidence we have uncovered is independent 
of the cycle. Finally, procyclicality is, of course, an issue, but an analysis of the possible feedback 
from FVA to the economy is definitely beyond the scope of this paper. We leave all these 
unresolved issues for future research. 
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Appendix A: Codes for accounting data 
The Bank Regulatory Database from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago contains five databases with accounting data for 
regulated depository financial institutions (bank holding companies, commercial banks, savings banks, and savings and loans 
institutions). Data come from the required regulatory forms filed for supervising purposes. The Commercial Bank Database 
contains data from all banks filing the Report of Condition and Income that are regulated by the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Comptroller of the Currency. These reports include balance sheet, 
income statements, risk-based capital measures and off-balance sheet data. It includes commercial banks and savings banks, 
but not savings institutions that file the Thrift Financial Report (TFR) with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The Bank 
Holding Companies Database collects financial data from bank holding companies included in the FRY-9 reports. These 
reports contain balance sheet, income information, risk-based capital measures and additional supporting schedules. 
The codes of the variables that we have used in our analysis are: 
Variables  Code for Commercial Banks  Code for Bank Holding Companies 
Applicable Income Taxes  RIAD4302  BHCK4302 
Available‐for‐sale securities  RCFD1773  BHCK1773 
Deposits  RCFD2200  BHDM6631+BHDM6636+BHFN6631+BHFN6636 
Equity  RCFD3210  BHCK3210 
Fixed assets  RCFD2145  BHCK2145 
Held‐to‐maturity securities  RCFD1754  BHCK1754 
Liquid assets  RCFD0010  BHCK0010 
Loan Loss Provision  RIAD4230  BHCK4230 
Net income*  RIAD4340  BHCK4340 
Net loans and leases  RCFD1600+RCFD1766  BHCK2122+BHCK2165 
Net unrealized holding gains (losses) 
on available‐for‐sale securities  RCFD8434  BHCK8434 
Realized gains (losses) on available‐
for‐sale securities* RIAD3196  BHCK3196 
Securities  RCFD1754+RCFD1773+RCFD3545  Before 1995: BHCK1754+BHCK1773+BHCK2146From 1995: BHCK1754+BHCK1773+BHCK3545 
Tier I capital  RCFD8274  BHCK8274 
Total Assets  RCFD2170  BHCK2170 
Trading securities  RCFD3545  Before 1995: BHCK2146 From 1995: BHCK3545 
Risk‐Weighted Assets  RCFDA223  BHCKA223 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
* Variables measured as cumulative year-to-date value. 
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Figure1 
Evolution of the median proportion of AFS and HTM securities 
The graphs show the evolution over time of the median value of AFS/Total Assets and HTM/Total Assets in the cross-section of all 
banks, Listed Banks and BHCs. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics - Financial Instruments in Banks’ Balance Sheets 
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Panel A: ALL
AFS/Total Assets 0.184 0.164 0.139 
HTM/ Total Assets 0.065 0.005 0.114 
TA/Total Assets 0.000 0.001 0.011 
Panel B: Listed 
AFS/Total Assets 0.177 0.165 0.102 
HTM/ Total Assets 0.047 0.008 0.081 
TA/Total Assets 0.005 0.000 0.028 
Panel C: Non-listed 
AFS/Total Assets 0.184 0.164 0.140 
HTM/ Total Assets 0.066 0.004 0.115 
TA/Total Assets 0.001 0.000 0.010 
All variables are available from 1994Q1 until 2010Q4. AFS/Total Assets: Available-for-Sale 
instruments over Total Assets; HTM/Total Assets: Held-to-Maturity over Total Assets; TA/Total Assets: 
Trading securities over Total Assets. ALL: All banks; Listed: banks for which the quarterly return can 
be computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks. The number of observations is 
N=666,889 (Panel A), N=26,093 (Panel B) and N= 640,796 (Panel C). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis – Whole Sample 
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Panel A: ALL 
RAFS  2.7E-5  0.0000 3.9E-4 
NIBR  0.0033  0.0036 0.0045 
T1  0.1693  0.1345 0.1719 
LLP -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0025 
Size 11.823 11.658 1.4759 
Deposits  0.8287  0.8523 0.0972 
Liquid  0.0479  0.0361 0.0485 
Loans  0.6237  0.6434 0.1555 
Securities  0.2497  0.2311 0.1473 
Fixed  0.0180  0.0156 0.0128 
Nondep  0.0652  0.0357 0.0834 
Panel B: Listed 
RAFS  4.84E-5  0.0000 4.6E-4 
NIBR  0.0034  0.0039 0.0041 
T1  0.1237  0.1155 0.0485 
LLP -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0022 
Size 14.362 13.980 1.6620 
Deposits  0.7662  0.7870 0.1081 
Liquid  0.0177  0.0120 0.0197 
Loans  0.6633  0.6787 0.1259 
Securities  0.2289  0.2159 0.1161 
Fixed  0.0168  0.0155 0.0089 
Nondep  0.1431  0.1219 0.1074 
Panel C: Non-listed 
RAFS  2.6E-5  0.0000 3.9E-4 
NIBR  0.0033  0.0036 0.0046 
T1  0.1712  0.1358 0.1749 
LLP -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0025 
Size 11.719 11.591 1.3720 
Deposits  0.8313  0.8542 0.0959 
Liquid  0.0491  0.0370 0.0489 
Loans  0.6220  0.6415 0.1564 
Securities  0.2506  0.2318 0.1484 
Fixed  0.0181  0.0156 0.0129 
Nondep  0.0620  0.0332 0.0808 
This table displays statistics of all the variables included in the regression analyses. All variables 
are defined in section 3. Variables are available from 1994Q1 until 2010Q4 except for T1, 
available from 1996Q1 until 2010Q4. Variables are normalized by total assets, except for T1, 
already a ratio, and Size, measured as log(total assets). ALL: All banks; Listed: banks for which 
the quarterly return can be computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks. Panel A: 
N=666,889, except for Tier 1, N=571,685; Panel B: N=26,093, except for Tier 1, N=23,050; 
Panel C: N=640,796, except for Tier 1, N=548,635. 
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Table 3a. Baseline model – All Banks 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
 1994Q1-2010Q4  1996Q1-2010Q4 
Constant -0.004  0.004 
RAFSit-1  0.039**  0.039** 
NIBRit -0.294*** -0.307*** 
T1it-1     – -0.005*** 
Sizeit  8.8E-4***  7.9E-4*** 
Depit -0.008** -0.014*** 
Liquidit  0.003  0.007 
Loansit  0.001 -2.5E-4 
Secit  0.009***  0.012*** 
Fixedit  0.043***  0.040*** 
Nondepit -0.003 -0.010* 
Unempt  0.003  2.9E-4 
N 666,889 571,685 
R2 (%) 1.34 1.46 
All variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates 
obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and the time 
period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, 
for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in 
percentage points. N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3b. Baseline model – Listed vs Non-listed Banks 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
 Listed  Non-listed 
 
1994Q1-
2010Q4 
 
1996Q1-
2010Q4 
 1994Q1-
2010Q4 
 
1996Q1-
2010Q4 
Constant  0.011  0.009 -0.005   0.004 
RAFSit-1  0.057*  0.056*  0.038**   0.038** 
NIBRit  0.021 -0.044 -0.302***  -0.313*** 
T1it-1     – -0.002      –  -0.005*** 
Sizeit -3.4E-4 -2.8E-4 9.5E-4***  8.5E-4*** 
Depit -0.014 -0.010 -0.008**  -0.014*** 
Liquidit  0.088***  0.100***  0.002   0.005 
Loansit  4.9E-4 -0.001  0.001   -2.6E-4 
Secit  0.025***  0.030***  0.008***   0.012*** 
Fixedit  0.025  0.026  0.041***   0.038*** 
Nondepit  0.004 -0.003 -0.004  -0.011* 
Unempt -0.001 -0.004  0.003   5.5E-4 
N 25,927 22,891  640,886  548,715 
R2 (%) 2.15 2.41  1.33  1.44 
All variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS 
with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and the time period as clusters. All coefficients 
(except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to 
rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. Listed: banks for which the quarterly return can 
be computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of observations; *, ** and 
***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3c. Baseline model – Are “extreme” banks driving the results? 
 
 
  Decile Variable: NIBR 
  All Banks Listed Non-listed 
Decile 
 Mean  
RAFS 
negative 
RAFS 
Mean  
RAFS 
negative 
RAFS 
Mean  
RAFS 
negative 
RAFS 
1  0.00461 8.59% 0.00219 20.45% 0.00467 8.26% 
2  0.00630 9.40% 0.01122 16.36% 0.00617 9.19% 
3  0.00503 10.13% 0.00862 14.81% 0.00489 9.96% 
4  0.00362 10.62% 0.00663 15.18% 0.00351 10.43% 
5  0.00268 10.88% 0.00569 14.79% 0.00253 10.71% 
6  0.00202 10.69% 0.00364 17.92% 0.00193 10.37% 
7  0.00158 10.71% 0.00435 17.37% 0.00146 10.39% 
8  0.00085 10.60% 0.00229 17.43% 0.00078 10.27% 
9  0.00063 10.12% 0.00306 19.04% 0.00052 9.73% 
10  -0.00039 9.45% 0.00102 18.63% -0.00045 9.09% 
The table shows the means of RAFS and the % of negative RAFS by deciles of the distribution of NIBR. RAFS and 
NIBR have been multiplied by 100 in order to aid interpretation of the numbers.  
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Table 3d. Baseline model – Pre-crisis and crisis period 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
  ALL  Listed  Non-listed 
Constant   0.004  0.010  0.004 
Dit   0.001 -0.017*  0.002 
RAFSit-1   0.081***  0.061*  0.082*** 
Dit·RAFSit-1  -0.052*** -0.008 -0.054** 
NIBRit  -0.204***  0.047 -0.205*** 
T1it-1  -0.005*** -0.012 -0.005*** 
Dit·NIBRit  -0.229** -0.498 -0.237** 
Dit·T1it-1   0.002  0.123*  0.002 
Sizeit   7.0E-4*** -2.3E-4  7.4E-4*** 
Depit  -0.013*** -0.011 -0.013*** 
Liquidit   0.004  0.106***  0.003 
Loansit  -5.4E-4 -0.001 -5.8E-4 
Secit   0.012***  0.028***  0.011*** 
Fixedit   0.041***  0.024  0.039*** 
Nondepit  -0.009  0.002 -0.009 
Unempt  -5.5E-4 -0.002 -4.0E-4 
N  571,685  22,891  548,715 
R2 (%)  1.77  2.57  1.78 
Dit is a dummy variable that takes value one for the quarters 2007Q3-2010Q4. All other 
variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via 
OLS with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and the time period as clusters. All 
coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of 
exposition: this is equivalent to rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. ALL: 
All banks; Listed: banks for which the quarterly return can be computed from the CRSP data; 
Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 3e. Baseline model – Pre-crisis and crisis period 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
  ALL  Listed  Non-listed 
 
 1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 2007Q3-
2010Q4 
 1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 2007Q3-
2010Q4 
 1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 2007Q3-
2010Q4 
Constant   0.002   0.014   0.070*  -0.203*   0.001   0.014 
RAFSit-1   0.080***   0.028*   0.059*   0.049*   0.081***   0.027 
NIBRit  -0.209***  -0.478***  -0.094  -0.307  -0.208***  -0.484*** 
T1it-1  -0.004***  -0.006***  -0.030   0.137  -0.004***  -0.006*** 
Sizeit   8.6E-4***  -6.4E-5  -4.3E-4   8.4E-4   9.0E-4***   4.6E-5 
Depit  -0.014***  -0.012  -8.8E-4   0.157  -0.013***  -0.012 
Liquidit  -7.8E-4   0.010   0.026   0.161***  -4.3E-4   0.008 
Loansit   0.001  -2.4E-4  -8.8E-4   0.029   0.001  -6.9E-4 
Secit   0.011***   0.022***   0.028***   0.076*   0.011***   0.021*** 
Fixedit   0.026***   0.094***  -0.033   0.232   0.025***   0.089*** 
Nondepit  -0.007  -0.018  -0.067*   0.136  -0.013***  -0.019 
Unempt   0.010***  -0.008   0.015***  -0.014   0.009***  -0.007 
N  456,767  114,918  18,660  4,231  438,038  110,677 
R2 (%)  2.56 1.78 2.31 4.63 2.58 1.71 
All variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard 
errors using the bank and the time period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness 
of exposition: this is equivalent to rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. ALL: All banks; Listed: banks for which the 
quarterly return can be computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant 
at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3f. Baseline model –Banks with negative vs. positive NIBR 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
 Positive NIBR  Negative NIBR 
 
1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 
2007Q2-
2010Q4 
 1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 
2007Q2-
2010Q4 
Constant  0.015***  0.031* -0.013  -0.013 
RAFSit-1  0.078***  0.021  0.100***   0.074*** 
NIBRit -0.396*** -0.634***  0.234***   0.235*** 
T1it-1 -0.005*** -0.006**   8.6E-4  -0.007* 
Sizeit 9.4E-4*** -3.3E-4 1.4E-4   6.7E-4 
Depit -0.026*** -0.026**  0.007   0.005 
Liquidit  -0.003  0.006  0.007   0.018 
Loansit -4.2E-4 -0.001  0.006*   0.010 
Secit  0.009***  0.016**  0.021***   0.068*** 
Fixedit  0.026***  0.092***  0.029*   0.060** 
Nondepit -0.018*** -0.033  0.012  -0.009 
Unempt  0.009*** -0.007  0.018***  -0.009 
N 429,453 88,520  27,314  26,398 
R2 (%) 2.73 1.51  2.57  3.86 
Mean values of RAFS and NIBR 
RAFSit 0.00326 0.00226  0.00457  0.01255 
NIBRit 0.41079 0.30759 -0.41051 -0.59147 
All variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS 
with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and the time period as clusters. All coefficients 
(except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to 
rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: 
significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. The mean values of RAFSit and NIBRit in the lower panel are 
expressed as percentages. 
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Table 3g. Baseline model –Banks with negative vs. positive NIBR listed vs non-
listed 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
Listed Banks 
 Positive NIBR  Negative NIBR 
 
1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 
2007Q2-
2010Q4 
 1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 
2007Q2-
2010Q4 
RAFSit-1  0.057  0.129***  0.075   0.035 
NIBRit -1.444*** -3.262***  1.267*   0.715*** 
T1it-1 -0.015  0.220***  -0.407**   0.019 
N 18,114 3,000  546  1,231 
R2 (%) 3.11 7.46  4.16  5.77 
Median values of T1 
T1it-1 0.1160 0.1149 0.1149 0.1050 
Non-listed Banks 
 Positive NIBR  Negative NIBR 
 
1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 
2007Q2-
2010Q4 
 1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 
2007Q2-
2010Q4 
RAFSit-1  0.079***  0.020  0.100***   0.083*** 
NIBRit -0.377*** -0.604***  0.221***   0.213*** 
T1it-1 -0.005*** -0.006**   0.001  -0.006* 
N 411,274 85,506  26,764  25,171 
R2 (%) 2.71 1.44  2.74  3.99 
Median values of T1 
T1it-1 0.1363 0.1325 0.1625 0.1214 
All variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS 
with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and the time period as clusters. All coefficients 
(except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to 
rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. Listed: banks for which the quarterly return can 
be computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of observations; *, ** and 
***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. The last row of each panel contains the median values of 
T1it-1 for each subsample.  
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Table 3h. Baseline model – Bank Holding Companies vs. Commercial Banks 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
 BHC  Com 
 
1996Q1- 
2007Q2 
 
2007Q3-
20010Q4 
 1996Q1- 
2007Q2 
 2007Q3-
20010Q4 
Constant  0.076***  0.018 -7.8E-4  0.012 
RAFSit-1  0.094***  0.084**  0.075***  0.024 
NIBRit -0.427*** -0.459** -0.195*** -0.485*** 
T1it-1 -0.028*** -0.008 -0.003*** -0.006*** 
Sizeit  1.6E-4 -1.6E-4  8.0E-4*** -2.2E-5 
Depit -0.089*** -0.006 -0.010*** -0.011 
Liquidit  0.022  0.036  0.001  0.008 
Loansit  0.006 -0.014  0.001 -3.9E-4 
Secit  0.024***  0.013  0.010***  0.022*** 
Fixedit  0.051*  0.298***  0.022***  0.078*** 
Nondepit -0.070*** -0.019 -0.005 -0.015 
Unempt  0.011***  0.018  0.009*** -0.007 
N 70,205  13,302  386,562  101,616 
R2 (%) 3.65  4.68  2.26  1.57 
All variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster 
standard errors using the bank and the time period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 
100, for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. BHC: Bank Holding 
Companies; Com: Commercial Banks. N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4a 
“Use of AFS assets”: Income smoothing as a function of the level of AFS assets in the balance sheet 
 
     
  1996Q1-2007Q2  2007Q3-2010Q4 
  ALL Listed Non-listed  ALL Listed Non-listed 
Constant  0.003  0.061*  7.6E-4   0.010 -0.199*  0.013 
RAFSit-1  0.166***  0.057*  0.080***   0.171***  0.050*  0.027 
NIBRit -0.104***  0.550 -0.121***  -0.183**  0.279 -0.241*** 
T1t-1 -0.003*** -0.022 -0.003***  -0.003  0.127 -0.004* 
AFSit-1  0.012***  0.030**  0.014***   0.039***  0.053**  0.047*** 
AFSit-1·NIBRit -0.599** -2.748 -0.510  -1.643*** -3.941 -1.690*** 
Sizeit  7.9E-4*** -3.2E-4 8.8E-4***   6.4E-5  8.8E-4  6.6E-5 
Depit -0.013*** -0.062 -0.012***  -0.013  0.157 -0.015 
Liquidit  2.1E-4  0.028  4.2E-4   0.012  0.155***  0.012* 
Loansit  5.0E-4 -0.003  8.6E-4   0.002  0.024  0.002 
Secit  0.002  0.008  0.002  -0.010*  0.023 -0.011** 
Fixedit  0.021*** -0.027  0.020***   0.080***  0.194  0.084*** 
Nondepit -0.008* -0.046 -0.008*  -0.022  0.139 -0.023 
Unempt  0.009***  0.014***  0.009***  -0.006 -0.014 -0.007 
N  451,062 18,660 438,038  113,529 4,231 110,677 
R2 (%)  3.83 2.60 2.74  4.01 4.96 2.11 
AFSit-1 denotes the proportion of AFS assets in the bank’s balance sheet at quarter t-1: for the sake of interpretation, its range has been 
normalized to [0,1] by dividing over the maximum value in each sample (0.903, 0.760, 0.988). All other variables are defined in section 
3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and the time 
period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to 
rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. ALL: All banks; Listed: banks for which the quarterly return can be computed 
from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4b 
“Opportunity”: Income smoothing as a function of the level of unrealized gains in AFS assets 
 
     
  1996Q1-2007Q2  2007Q3-2010Q4 
  ALL Listed Non-listed  ALL Listed Non-listed 
Constant -0.010***  0.042 -0.011***   0.001 -0.250**  0.013 
RAFSit-1  0.068***  0.045*  0.069***   0.023*  0.026  0.023 
NIBRit -0.197*** -0.250 -0.195***  -0.448***  -0.198 -0.453*** 
T1t-1 -3.8E-4 -0.008 -2.4E-4  -7.9E-4  0.111 -7.3E-4 
UNRAFSit-1  0.207***  0.195***  0.201***   0.498***  0.207***  0.492*** 
UNRAFSit-1·NIBRit -4.212** -20.44*** -4.010**  -17.48*** -6.046 -17.51*** 
Sizeit  6.0E-4*** -7.4E-4* 6.1E-4***   8.2E-5  6.2E-4  2.0E-4 
Depit  0.004 -0.031  0.004   0.007  0.241**  0.005 
Liquidit -0.003  0.023 -0.003  -0.005  0.136*** -0.006 
Loansit  1.2E-4 -0.005  3.3E-4  -0.009*** -0.002 -0.008** 
Secit  0.009***  0.021**  0.009***   0.002  0.051  0.002 
Fixedit  0.035*** -0.022  0.034***   0.089***  0.201  0.083*** 
Nondepit  0.013*** -0.009  0.013***   0.015  0.235**  0.014 
Unempt  0.006***  0.007*  0.005***  -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 
N  456,748 18,659 438,020  114,918 4,231 110,677 
R2 (%)  5.04 7.22 5.04  5.89 9.12 5.82 
UNRAFSit-1 denotes the amount of unrealized gains/losses in AFS assets in the bank’s balance sheet at quarter t-1: for the sake of interpretation, 
its range has been normalized to [-0.65,1] by dividing over the maximum value in each sample (0.159, 0.043, 0.159).. All other variables are 
defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and 
the time period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent 
to rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. ALL: All banks; Listed: banks for which the quarterly return can be computed from the 
CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5a 
“Loss Avoidance”: Banks that reversed negative profits through RAFS 
 
  
 1996Q1-2010Q4 1996Q1-2007Q2 2007Q3-2010Q4 
Constant      0.223***      0.178**      0.304*** 
RAFSit-1      0.025*      0.071*      0.017 
NIBRit -105.35*** -115.91*** -100.03*** 
T1it-1     -0.048**     -0.024     -0.086* 
Sizeit     -0.001      0.003     -0.003** 
Depit     -0.125**     -0.137*     -0.138** 
Liquidit      0.028     -0.057      0.049 
Loansit     -0.051*     -0.021     -0.105** 
Secit      0.037      0.011      0.020 
Fixedit     -0.056     -0.015     -0.086 
Nondepit     -0.149***     -0.203**     -0.129* 
Unempt     -0.003     -0.013     -0.003 
N 2,286 811 1,475 
R2 (%) 48.01 47.24 49.99 
p-value   0.06   0.00   0.99 
All variables are defined in section 3. This table contains the results of the estimation of the baseline model only for banks 
with negative NIBRit and a positive value of RAFSit sufficient to make net income before taxes nonnegative. Numbers in the 
table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and the time period as 
clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of exposition: this is 
equivalent to rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. P-value: p-value of the test of the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient associated to NIBRit is equal to -100. N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5b 
Full sample omitting the loss avoiding banks 
 
 Dependent variable: RAFSit 
 1996Q1-2010Q4 1996Q1-2007Q2 2007Q3-2010Q4 
Constant  0.004  0.001  0.015 
RAFSit-1  0.037**  0.076***  0.027 
NIBRit -0.223*** -0.148*** -0.395*** 
T1it-1 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005** 
Sizeit  7.3E-4***  8.8E-4*** -2.2E-4 
Depit -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013 
Liquidit  0.004 -9.5E-4  0.009 
Loansit  5.9E-4  0.002  0.002 
Secit  0.012***  0.011***  0.020*** 
Fixedit  0.035***  0.023***  0.082*** 
Nondepit -0.011* -0.007 -0.024 
Unempt -5.7E-4  0.009*** -0.007 
N 569,399 455,956 113,443 
R2 (%) 1.33 2.42 1.68 
All variables are defined in section 3. This table contains the results of the estimation of the baseline model excluding 
data for banks with negative NIBRit and a positive value of RAFSit sufficient to make net income before taxes 
nonnegative. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors 
using the bank and the time period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, 
for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. N: number of 
observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6a. The 4th quarter effect: cumulative end-of-year income 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
 1996Q1-2010Q4  1996Q1-2007Q2  2007Q3-2010Q4 
 ALL Listed Non-listed  ALL Listed Non-listed  ALL Listed Non-listed 
RAFSit-1  0.039**  0.056*  0.038**   0.080***  0.059*  0.082***   0.028*  0.049*  0.027 
NIBRit -0.297*** -0.071 -0.303***  -0.189*** -0.416 -0.185***  -0.446*** -0.158 -0.463*** 
T1it-1 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.005***  -0.004*** -0.031* -0.004***  -0.006***  0.141 -0.006*** 
D4it -9.4E-4 -0.003 -8.8E-4  -2.5E-4 -0.009* -1.1E-4  -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
D4it·YNIBRit -0.025  0.005 -0.023  -0.039  0.408** -0.042  -0.059* -0.251*** -0.046 
N 571,685 22,891 548,715 456,767 18,660 438,038  114,918 4,231 110,677 
R2 (%) 1.48 2.50 1.46 2.59 2.54 2.60 1.84 4.81 1.76 
YNIBRit denotes the cumulative end-of-year income before taxes and fourth quarter RAFSit. D4it is a dummy that takes value one if t is the fourth quarter of the year. Coefficients on 
control variables and on the intercept have not been tabulated. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank 
and the time period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to rescaling RAFSit by expressing 
it in percentage points. ALL: All banks; Listed: banks for which the quarterly return can be computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of ; *, ** and ***: 
significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6b. The 4th quarter effect: “large” realizations 
 
Dependent variable: bigRAFSit 
 1996Q1-2010Q4  1996Q1-2007Q2  2007Q3-2010Q4 
 ALL Listed Non-listed  ALL Listed Non-listed  ALL Listed Non-listed 
bigRAFSit-1    2.956***   1.448***  3.012***     3.138***  1.523***  3.198***     2.387***  1.120***  2.432*** 
NIBRit -10.28*** -34.55*** -9.191***   -2.138 -59.28*** -1.139  -15.01*** -19.81*** -14.00*** 
T1it-1    0.215*** -1.704**  0.220**     0.206** -2.339**  0.213**     0.395*** -0.173  0.385*** 
D4it    0.123**  0.221*  0.120**     0.200***  0.271**  0.197***    -0.043  0.035 -0.048 
D4it·YNIBRit    0.426 -1.200  0.470     0.071  -0.493  0.135     0.200 -5.754  0.312 
N 571,685 22,891 548,715  456,767 18,660 438,038  114,918 4,231 110,677 
pseudoR2 (%) 27.62 8.00 28.57  30.00 7.30 31.07  20.01 7.05 20.07 
bigRAFSit is a variable that takes value one if RAFSit is one standard deviation away from the bank-specific average. YNIBRit denotes the cumulative end-of-year income before taxes and 
fourth quarter RAFSit. D4it is a dummy that takes value one if t is the fourth quarter of the year. Coefficients on control variables and on the intercept have not been tabulated. Numbers in 
the table are logit coefficient estimates obtained via maximum likelihood with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank and the time period as clusters. ALL: All banks; Listed: 
banks for which the quarterly return can be computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of ; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Adoption of SFAS 159: 2007Q4 and 2008Q1 
 
Dependent variable: RAFSit 
 
1996Q1-2010Q4 
Dummy 2007Q4 
 
1996Q1-2010Q4 
Dummy 2007Q4 and 2008Q1 
 ALL Listed Non-listed  ALL Listed Non-listed 
Constant  0.005  0.012  0.004   0.004  0.010  0.004 
Dit  0.002 -0.016*  0.002   0.001 -0.018*  0.002 
RAFSit-1  0.081***  0.061*  0.083***   0.081***  0.061*  0.082*** 
Dit · RAFSit-1 -0.052** -0.008 -0.055**  -0.052** -0.008 -0.054** 
NIBRit -0.204***  0.047 -0.206***  -0.204***  0.047  -0.205*** 
T1it-1 -0.005*** -0.013 -0.005***  -0.005*** -0.012 -0.005*** 
Dit · NIBRit -0.238** -0.378 -0.246**  -0.257** -0.412 -0.265*** 
Dit · T1it-1  0.002  0.117*  0.002   0.002  0.129*  0.002 
07Q4it -0.006** -0.010** -0.006**  -0.006** -0.009** -0.005** 
07Q4it · NIBRit  0.259*** -0.018  0.268***   0.278***  0.009  0.287*** 
08Q1it – – –   0.004  0.012***  0.003 
08Q1it · NIBRit – – –   0.232** -0.842***  0.259*** 
Sizeit  6.8E-4** -2.6E-4 7.3E-4***   6.8E-4** -2.3E-4 7.4E-4*** 
Depit -0.013*** -0.012 -0.013***  -0.013*** -0.011 -0.013*** 
Liquidit  0.003  0.101***  0.003   0.003  0.108***  0.003 
Loansit -6.5E-4 -0.001 -6.9E-4  -6.5E-4 -8.2E-4 -4.7E-4 
Secit  0.012*** 0.028*** 0.011***   0.012***  0.028***  0.011*** 
Fixedit  0.041***  0.025 0.039***   0.041***  0.024  0.039*** 
Nondepit -0.009  0.002 -0.009  -0.009  0.002 -0.010* 
Unempt -8.0E-4 -0.003 -6.4E-4  -8.0E-4 -0.002 -4.5E-4 
N 571,685 22,891 548,715  571,685 22,891 548,715 
R2 (%) 1.79 2.62 1.80  1.81 2.69 1.82 
All variables are defined in section 3. 07Q4it is a dummy variable that takes value one in 2007Q4. 08Q1it is a dummy variable that takes 
value one in 2008Q1. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors using the bank 
and the time period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for RAFSit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of exposition: this is 
equivalent to rescaling RAFSit by expressing it in percentage points. ALL: All banks; Listed: banks for which the quarterly return can be 
computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. The Loan Loss Provision as a smoothing tool 
 
Dependent variable: LLPit 
 1996Q1-2007Q2  2007Q3-2010Q4 
 ALL Listed Non-listed  ALL Listed Non-listed 
Constant  0.005  0.239**  0.001   0.495***  3.380***  0.482*** 
LLPit-1  0.194***  0.394***  0.196***   0.366***  0.370***  0.362*** 
NIBRLLPit -8.249*** -1.350 -8.532***   7.093***  23.43*** 6.485*** 
T1it-1 -0.036*** -0.060 -0.034**  -0.126*** -2.369*** -0.116*** 
Sizeit  0.003*** -0.002  0.003***  -0.028*** -0.050*** -0.028*** 
Depit  0.002 -0.258***  0.010  -0.297** -2.838*** -0.183* 
Liquidit  0.014 -0.241  0.017  -0.131*** -0.177 -0.132*** 
Loansit -0.080*** -0.021 -0.082***  -0.159*** -0.268 -0.156*** 
Secit  0.058***  0.075*  0.057***   0.184***  0.519  0.180*** 
Fixedit -0.460*** -0.195 -0.477***   0.234  1.634  0.185 
Nondepit -0.075 -0.288*** -0.067  -0.240** -2.566*** -0.237** 
Unempt -0.034** -0.028** -0.034**  -0.050 -0.091** -0.049 
N 456,747 18,658 438,020  114,918 4,231 110,677 
R2 (%) 11.76 17.64 12.15  17.58 31.06 16.91 
All variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors 
using the bank and the time period as clusters. All coefficients (except that for LLPit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for cleanness of 
exposition: this is equivalent to rescaling LLPit by expressing it in percentage points. ALL: All banks; Listed: banks for which the quarterly 
return can be computed from the CRSP data; Non-listed: all other banks; N: number of observations; *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 9. RAFS vs the LLP 
 
 Dependent variable: RAFSit   Dependent variable: LLPit 
 
1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 2007Q3-
2010Q4 
 
 
1996Q1-
2007Q2 
 2007Q3-
2010Q4 
Constant  0.003   0.014  Constant  0.006     0.496*** 
RAFSit-1  0.080***   0.028*  LLPit-1  0.194***     0.365*** 
NIBRLLPit -0.225***  -0.467***  NIBRLLPit -8.261***     7.030*** 
LLPit -0.143**  -0.491***  RAFSit  -5.572**  -13.12*** 
T1it-1 -0.004***  -0.006***  T1it-1 -0.036**   -0.127*** 
Sizeit  8.7E-4***  -7.3E-5  Sizeit  0.003***   -0.028*** 
Depit -0.014***  -0.012  Depit  0.001   -0.198** 
Liquidit -7.6E-4   0.010  Liquidit  0.014   -0.130*** 
Loansit  0.001  -2.9E-4  Loansit -0.080***   -0.159*** 
Secit  0.011***   0.022***  Secit  0.059***    0.187*** 
Fixedit  0.026***   0.095***  Fixedit -0.459***    0.247 
Nondepit -0.007  -0.018  Nondepit -0.075   -0.242** 
Unempt  0.010***  -0.008  Unempt -0.034**   -0.051 
N 456,767  114,918  N 456,747  114,918 
R2 (%) 2.56  1.78  R2 (%) 11.77  17.61 
p-value 0.17  0.86  p-value 0.39  0.00 
All variables are defined in section 3. Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates obtained via OLS with two-way cluster standard errors 
using the bank and the time period as clusters. All coefficients (except those for RAFSit-1 and LLPit-1) have been multiplied by 100, for 
cleanness of exposition: this is equivalent to rescaling RAFSit and LLPit by expressing them in percentage points. N: number of 
observations; p-value: p-value of the test for equality of the coefficients of NIBRLLPit and LLPit (left panel) and of the test for equality of 
the coefficients of NIBRLLPit and RAFSit (right panel); *, ** and ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
